

## Message Text

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ORIGIN EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SS-15 NSC-10 DODE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00

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OASD: RBARTHOLOMWEW

NSC:WHYLAND

S/S-O: K. KURZE

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T STATE 162345

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: ISSUES RAISED IN AUGUST 9 SPC DISCUSSION

REFS: (A) USNATO 3786 (B) STATE 158062

1. SEVERAL MAJOR QUESTIONS WERE RAISED IN AUGUST 9 SPC MEETING ON ALLIED POSITION IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS GUIDANCE ON WHICH YOU MAY DRAW ON PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES AND ON CONSTRAINTS AC-  
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COMPANYING REDUCTIONS. WE WILL ADDRESS OTHER APPROPRIATE POINTS RAISED IN AUGUST 9 AND 13 SESSIONS AND OTHERS AS THEY DEVELOP IN SUCCEEDING MESSAGES.

2. PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS. IN RESPONSE TO FRG QUESTION (PARA 8(C), REF A) AS TO WHETHER PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES WOULD APPLY TO OTHER EUROPEAN FORCES IN NGA AS WELL AS US AND SOVIET FORCES, OUR VIEW CONTINUES TO BE THAT EXPRESSED IN PARA 14 OF STATE 158062, I.E., THAT PRE-REDUCTION MEASURES, IF THESE ARE AGREED, WOULD INTER ALIA SERVE PURPOSE OF CREATING CONFIDENCE AS WELL AS PROVIDING A MULTILATERAL DIMENSION FOR THE FIRST PHASE OF

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. FOR THESE REASONS, WE SEE ADVANTAGES TO ASSOCIATION BY ALLIES AND WARSAW PACT MEMBERS WITH FORCES OR TERRITORIES IN NGA IN THE THREE MEASURES IN THIS CATEGORY DEALING WITH EXERCISES RATHER THAN MOVEMENTS. THIS POSITION IS ALSO IN KEEPING WITH ALLIED PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSTRAINTS. YOU MAY AS NEEDED ADD THAT, IF ALLIES UPON CAREFUL CONSIDERATION WOULD PREFER NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THESE MEASURES, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THIS POSITION ALTHOUGH WE WOULD WISH TO WEIGH CAREFULLY WITH THE ALLIES WHETHER THE MORE PRONOUNCED BILATERAL CHARACTER IT WOULD ADD TO AN OVERALL PHASE ONE AGREEMENT WOULD BE DESIRABLE AND ALSO WHETHER IT WOULD BE REALISTIC TO EXPECT SOVIETS TO ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT NO CONSTRAINTS ON NON-US ALLIED FORCES SHOULD BE AGREED IN FIRST PHASE. (SEE BELOW ON CONSTRAINTS ACCOMPANYING REDUCTIONS.) IN THIS CONTEXT, IF FURTHER DISCUSSION SHOWS THERE IS IN FACT STRONG ALLIED RELUCTANCE TO JOIN IN SUCH MEASURES, OUR PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE PRIOR INTERNAL AGREEMENT AMONG ALLIES THAT DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE WEST WOULD PUT FORWARD CONCEPT OF PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS APPLICABLE ONLY TO US AND SOVIET FORCES, BUT HOLD IN RESERVE THE POSSIBILITY OF AGREEING WITH EAST TO APPLY THEM TO OTHER ALLIED AND  
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WP FORCES AS WELL.

3. WE SEEK ALLIED AGREEMENT THAT EASTERN AGREEMENT TO PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS SHOULD NOT BE A PRE-REQUISITE TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON OTHER CONTENT OF FIRST PHASE. IN RESPONSE TO FRG POINT (PARA 6 REF A) THAT IT MAY BE UNWISE TO RECORD INTERNAL ALLIED AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT IN WRITING, AS WELL AS MISSION COMMENT THAT OTHER ALLIES SHARE THIS SENTIMENT BOTH WITH REGARD TO PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS AND TO INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION, YOU MAY INDICATE THAT US IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER AN ORAL AGREEMENT AMONG ALLIES ON THESE POINTS WHICH WOULD NOT NEED TO BE RECORDED OR INCORPORATED INTO WRITTEN GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATIONS. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, THAT THE FACT THAT INTERNAL ALLIED AGREEMENTS ON THESE TOPICS WOULD NOT BE RECORDED IN WRITING DOES NOT AFFECT WELL KNOWN US VIEWS ON THESE SUBJECTS. WE WOULD EXPECT EXPLICIT ORAL AGREEMENT ON THEM FROM ALLIES BEGIN FYI

RATHER THAN LACK OF COMMENT WHICH COULD LATER BE USED TO RE-OPEN THE ISSUES AS NEW QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE. END FYI.

4. THE QUESTION OF APPLICABILITY OF CONSTRAINTS ACCOMPANYING REDUCTIONS TO OTHER PARTICIPANTS THAN US AND USSR HAS BEEN RAISED (PARA 8(C) REF A). MISSION CORRECTLY TOLD ALLIES THAT US ENVISAGES THAT THE TWO PROPOSED CONSTRAINTS ACCOMPANYING REDUCTIONS WOULD APPLY TO US AND USSR RATHER THAN TO OTHER ALLIES AND WP MEMBERS. YOU MAY EXPLAIN THAT THIS IS BECAUSE THESE TWO MEASURES, AS LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENTS, ARE MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN THE MEASURES ENVISAGED FOR A PRE-REDUCTION PHASE DESIGNED TO CREATE CONFIDENCE AND TO EMPHASIZE EARLY IN NEGOTIATIONS THE IMPORTANCE ALLIES ATTACH TO THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF CONSTRAINTS. YOU MAY FURTHER NOTE THAT, IN OUR VIEW, IT WOULD BE A REASONABLE NEGOTIATING CONCEPT TO RESERVE CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION OF MEASURES OF THIS TYPE TO OTHER ALLIES (WHICH WE PRESUME WILL BE A SOVIET DESIDERATUM) FOR A SECOND PHASE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. AT THAT POINT, THE ALLIES WOULD DECIDE WHETHER THEY WISH TO SEEK TO APPLY SUCH MEASURES TO NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT MEMBERS AS WELL AS TO THEMSELVES. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO  
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POINT OUT THAT, IF EAST DOES NOT AGREE TO PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES, ALLIES WILL PRESUMABLY WISH TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON MEASURES OF THIS TYPE AS ACCOMPANYING REDUCTIONS. IN THIS CASE, REPERTORY OF CONSTRAINT MEASURES THAT ALLIES WOULD SEEK WOULD INCLUDE BOTH MEASURES THAT WOULD APPLY TO US AND USSR ONLY, AND THOSE THAT COULD ALSO APPLY TO OTHER ALLIES AND WP MEMBERS.

5. CONCERNING CONSTRAINTS ON MOVEMENT OF FORCES ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, REF A PARA 4 REPORTED BELGIAN REP'S CONCERN THAT STABILIZING MEASURE ACCOMPANYING FIRST PHASE REDUCTION LIMITING MOVEMENT OF FORCES ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES WITHIN NGA MIGHT SET UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT FOR NON-US FORCES DURING SECOND PHASE, WITH POSSIBLE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR MOVEMENTS OF BELGIAN FORCES ACROSS BELGIAN-FRG BORDER, FOR OTHER ALLIED MOVEMENTS WITHIN NGA, AND FOR FUTURE WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION GENERALLY. YOU MAY RESPOND THAT WE FAVOR SUCH A MEASURE IN THE FIRST PHASE OF MBFR BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE WE AND OTHER ALLIES ATTACH TO RESTRAINING SOVIET MOVEMENTS ACROSS BORDERS IN EASTERN EUROPE. WE DO NOT THINK A MEASURE APPLIED TO US AND SOVIET FORCES WOULD AUTOMATICALLY PREJUDGE THE SITUATION IN FAVOR OF INCLUSION OF OTHER ALLIES OR NSWP IN SIMILAR MEASURES IN SECOND PHASE. THE SITUATION OF THE US AND USSR CAN BE DIFFERENTIATED FROM THAT OF OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS

ON BOTH SIDES AND THERE WILL BE WHOLE NEW RANGE OF NEGOTIATING FACTORS IN PHASE TWO. A DECISION ON THIS MATTER WOULD IN ANY CASE BE RESERVED FOR LATER ALLIED CONSIDERATION.

6. NETHERLANDS REP (PARA 12 REF A) HAS ASKED ABOUT PARA 22(C) OF US PAPER OF JULY 27 CONCERNING AGREEMENT TO RESPECT THE NEW OVERALL RELATIONSHIP IN THE LEVELS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES ESTABLISHED BY FIRST PHASE REDUCTION AGREEMENT. WE DO NOT ENVISAGE A LIMITATION ON QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS AND WOULD STRONGLY RESIST ANY SOVIET ATTEMPT  
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IN THE MBFR CONTEXT TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON NATO FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WOULD WISH TO ENSURE THAT SOVIETS WOULD NOT REVERSE A REDUCTION OF THEIR TANKS. LANGUAGE OF THE US PAPER DOES IMPLY A CEILING ON US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN NGA FOLLOWING PHASE ONE REDUCTIONS. OUR PRESENT ASSUMPTION IS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL IN ADDITION PRESS FOR AN OVERALL CEILING ON NATO AND PACT GROUND FORCES IN THE NGA AS A MEANS OF ENSURING THAT FORCE LEVELS OF OTHER ALLIES ARE NOT INCREASED TO COMPENSATE FOR US REDUCTIONS. SUCH A SOVIET INTEREST, ON WHICH THEY SHOULD BE LEFT TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE, COULD PROVIDE ALLIES WITH USEFUL BARGAINING LEVERAGE AND THE ALLIES COULD CONSIDER IT ON ITS MERITS AT THE TIME.

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